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SUNBEAM:  A RAY OF HOPE 
FOR TRADEMARK LICENSEES 
Ryan Gabay* 
 
In the 1985 decision Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 
the Fourth Circuit established that a licensor’s rejection of an intellectual 
property license under § 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code terminates the 
licensee’s right to continue using the license.  Concerned about the 
detrimental effects that Lubrizol would have on technological development 
in the United States, Congress responded swiftly by enacting the 
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act (IPLBA), which exempted 
certain forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights, patents, and trade 
secrets, from rejection under § 365 of the Code.  Trademarks, however, are 
notably absent from Congress’s definition of “intellectual property,” 
causing the trademark licensing community to question the reach of the 
IPLBA’s protections. 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that a trademark licensee may 
continue using a licensed trademark following rejection, despite Congress’s 
omission of trademarks from its listed definition of “intellectual property.”  
This Note examines the divide between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, 
and it contends that careful consideration of existing executory contract 
doctrine and the IPLBA’s legislative history, as well as the balance of 
equities, suggests that trademark licensees should retain their rights to 
continue utilizing licensed trademarks following rejection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Apple Inc. agrees to license its Apple logo to a hypothetical 
company, Company X, for use on Company X’s new line of computers.  
Suppose further that prior to Company X selling the newly branded 
computers, Apple Inc. falls into financial distress and files for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Section 365 of the Code 
provides that upon filing for bankruptcy, a debtor is permitted to reject an 
executory contract—that is, a contract in which substantial performance 
remains on both sides.  However, intellectual property is exempted from 
this provision of the Code.  Thus, if Apple Inc. chooses to reject its 
licensing agreement with Company X following Apple Inc.’s Chapter 11 
filing, an interesting dilemma results:  may Company X continue to utilize 
the Apple logo despite the licensor’s rejection of the trademark license in 
bankruptcy? 
In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC,1 
Chief Judge Easterbrook considered precisely this issue.  Previously, in 
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,2 the Fourth 
Circuit held that the rejection of an intellectual property license in 
bankruptcy terminates the licensee’s right to continue utilizing the license.3  
The Seventh Circuit, however, held that a trademark licensee is permitted to 
continue using the licensed trademark even after the licensor’s rejection of 
the license.4  Therefore, Sunbeam created a circuit split on the issue of 
whether a trademark licensee may retain its rights to continue use of a 
license following a debtor’s rejection in bankruptcy. 
Trademarks can be very valuable, and a trademark licensor has a 
significant interest in maintaining the right to continue utilizing a trademark 
after it has been rejected in bankruptcy.5  For instance, trademarks for well-
known brands such as Marlboro, Coca-Cola, and McDonald’s have 
estimated values of approximately $44.6 billion, $43 billion, and $19 
billion, respectively.6  In addition, for companies such as Sarah Lee Corp., 
trademarked brand names may account for approximately 70 percent of the 
company’s net worth.7  Especially in the age of the internet, in which 
consumers are more likely to find an easily identifiable product during web 
searches, the value of a simple and clear brand name has escalated.8 
 
 1. 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 2. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 3. See id. at 1048. 
 4. See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 378. 
 5. Trademark protection is critical to a company seeking to build its brand. See 
Stephanie Strom, Battle of the Brands, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at B1 (stating that 
trademarks can provide tremendous value to companies in strengthening their brands and 
pointing to Kimberly-Clark’s Kleenex facial tissues and Nike’s “swoosh” logo as examples). 
 6. Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous Trademarks:  Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of 
Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 425 n.17 (1998). 
 7. See id. at 425 n.14. 
 8. See Strom, supra note 5, at B1.  Take the Nike “swoosh” trademark, for example.  
The “swoosh” is Nike’s core value, and the company considers its “Nike” and “swoosh” 
248 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
It is commonly understood that intellectual property is comprised of 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets.9  Accordingly, one might 
reasonably expect that the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act 
(IPLBA),10 enacted by Congress in 1988 to exempt “intellectual property” 
from rejection under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, would include all four 
commonly recognized forms of intellectual property within its coverage.  In 
fact, the Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks within its listed 
definition of intellectual property, despite its recognition of copyrights, 
patents, and trade secrets.11  The omission of trademarks has, in many 
instances, had a profound impact on the rights of trademark licensees upon 
a debtor’s rejection of the license in bankruptcy. 
This Note assesses the vulnerability of trademark licenses following a 
licensor’s rejection.  Specifically, this Note seeks to address whether a 
licensee should be permitted to continue utilizing a licensed trademark after 
a licensor has rejected the trademark license under § 365(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Part I of this Note examines the crucial role of intellectual property 
licensing agreements in the business context and then addresses the IPLBA, 
which exempted intellectual property from rejection under § 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Part II analyzes the conflicting positions taken by the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, as well as several bankruptcy courts, regarding 
the rights retained by an intellectual property licensee following rejection of 
the license by the debtor.  Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that the 
circuit split should be resolved by following the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Sunbeam in order to avoid the harsh results of Lubrizol, and to prevent a 
chilling effect on the willingness of trademark licensees to enter into 
licensing deals with licensors facing financial difficulties.  Moreover, this 
Note asserts that Lubrizol incorrectly applied § 365(g) and contends that 
rejection of a trademark license constitutes a breach in which the parties’ 
rights should not be terminated.  While equitable considerations are relevant 
to a thorough understanding of trademark license rejection, this Note will 
look primarily to the Bankruptcy Code itself as a justification for 
 
design trademarks “to be among its most valuable assets.” See STEPHEN PAPSON & ROBERT 
GOLDMAN, NIKE CULTURE:  THE SIGN OF THE SWOOSH 15 (1999). 
 9. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining intellectual property to 
“comprise[ ] primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also include[] trade-secret 
rights”); Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the 
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 279 
(2004) (stating that the basic forms of intellectual property are patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets). 
 10. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 
2538 (1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006)). 
 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006).  Under its definition of intellectual property, the 
Code lists the following:  “(A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected 
under title 35; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected 
under title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17; to the extent protected 
by applicable non-bankruptcy law.”  Works of authorship include pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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maintaining the rights of a trademark licensee following rejection by the 
debtor. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 
REJECTION IN BANKRUPTCY 
Part I provides an overview of important intellectual property and 
bankruptcy concepts, and examines the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lubrizol 
as well as Congress’s enactment of the IPLBA.  Part I.A describes the 
various types of intellectual property, specifically focusing on the value of 
intellectual property licenses to the financial success and efficiency of 
businesses.  Part I.B examines the policies that underlie bankruptcy law and 
explains the consequences that arise following a debtor’s rejection of an 
executory contract.  Part I.C addresses the Lubrizol decision and Congress’s 
subsequent response in enacting the IPLBA. 
A.  An Overview of Intellectual Property Doctrine 
The following discussion summarizes basic intellectual property doctrine 
as background analysis to provide a foundation for the rest of this Note.  
The section begins by explaining the various categories of intellectual 
property.  It then focuses more narrowly on trademark protection and 
concludes by discussing the critical role that intellectual property licenses 
play for both debtors and creditors in the continued success and, in many 
instances, survival of their businesses. 
1.  Protection of Original Works and Inventions: 
Copyrights and Patents 
Intellectual property, as it is commonly understood, is comprised of 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets.12  Both copyrights and 
patents are expressly referenced in the U.S. Constitution,13 while 
trademarks and trade secrets are not.14 
Copyright protection is codified as part of federal law.15  It exists in any 
original work of authorship that is embodied in a tangible medium of 
expression and communicated either directly or with the assistance of a 
device.16  The categories of works of authorship include:  “(1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic 
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and 
 
 12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 14. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 
1294, 1297 (2004). 
 15. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 16. Id. 
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(8) architectural works.”17  Copyright protection may extend to the 
expression of an author’s ideas but will not “protect the ideas 
themselves.”18 
Patents comprise a second category of intellectual property.  Under the 
Patent Act, patent protection extends to any person who “invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”19  This 
patent eligibility inquiry, however, is only a threshold test for patent 
protection.20  Additionally, even if an invention or discovery qualifies as a 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, it must also 
satisfy certain other conditions and requirements such as novelty,21 
nonobviousness,22 and a full and particular description.23  While section 
101 of the Patent Act specifies particular subject matter that may be 
patented, it is meant to be a dynamic provision that is flexible enough to 
encompass novel and unanticipated inventions.24  Congress chose an 
adaptable rule because a rigid rule denying patent protection for inventions 
and discoveries in areas that Congress did not anticipate would frustrate the 
underlying purposes of patent law.25 
2.  Identifying and Distinguishing the Source of Goods:  
Trademark Protection 
Trademarks comprise a third type of intellectual property.  The subject 
matter of a trademark can vary widely and might include a word, color, 
design, scent, symbol, sound, or a wide array of other types of indicators of 
the source of goods.26  To qualify for legal protection, though, a mark must 
be distinctive.27  Only those marks that adequately distinguish the 
trademark applicant’s products from goods owned by others may be 
successfully registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.28 
Thus, the statutory definition of “trademark” states that the word, name, 
or symbol must be used or intended to be used to identify and differentiate 
the trademark owner’s products from goods that are manufactured or 
distributed by others, and to indicate the source of the products, even if the 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See 9 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY 
LAW & PRACTICE § 177:8–9 (3d ed. 2013). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 20. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 22. See id. § 103. 
 23. See id. § 112. 
 24. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001)). 
 25. See id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)). 
 26. 1–2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.01 (2007) (noting that the 
subject matter of trademarks is potentially endless). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006)). 
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source is not known.29  A design or pattern that is merely considered 
product ornamentation does not qualify for trademark protection, because it 
has not adequately distinguished itself.30 
Courts categorize marks based on a trademark distinctiveness spectrum.31  
Under this spectrum, courts will classify marks as:  (1) generic, (2) merely 
descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary or fanciful.32  However, the 
determination of which category a mark will fit into is not always clear.33  
Complicating factors include the possibilities that a term might have 
different meanings among different sets of users,34 and a term might refer to 
two separate products, each of which belongs to a separate category.35 
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,36 Judge Friendly 
formulated the test that courts use to determine where a mark falls on the 
trademark spectrum.  According to Judge Friendly, a generic term refers 
broadly to the genus or group of products, under which a particular product 
would be classified as the species.37  Under no circumstances may a generic 
mark be afforded trademark protection.38 
A term that is descriptive but not generic is more likely to be afforded 
protection.39  Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act disallows the registration of 
marks that are merely descriptive.40  However, section 2(f) provides an 
exemption to this general rule by extending trademark protection to 
descriptive terms that have become distinctive of the trademark applicant’s 
goods.41  As prima facie evidence that a mark has become distinctive, a 
trademark applicant may present proof of substantially exclusive and 
continuous use of the mark for five continuous years prior to the 
application.42 
Suggestive terms fall in between the categories of descriptive and 
fanciful.  A term will be suggestive if it is necessary to use thought, insight, 
 
 29. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. § 2.01[1]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“The lines of demarcation . . . are not always bright.”). 
 34. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
 35. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 n.6 (providing the example that “ivory” 
would be classified as generic if used to describe a product derived from elephant tusks but 
would be classified as arbitrary with respect to soap). 
 36. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. Id. (stating that the Lanham Act provides for the cancellation of a registered mark if 
at any time it becomes the common descriptive name of an article or substance).  Even if 
proof of a secondary meaning can be offered, a generic term cannot be transformed into a 
subject for trademark. Id. 
 39. Id. at 10 (stating that descriptive terms “stand[] on a better basis” than those that are 
generic). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006).  The Lanham Act is a federal act that provides 
statutory protection for trademarks and trade dress. See id. §§ 1051–1127. 
 41. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10. 
 42. See id. 
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and imagination to decipher the nature of the product.43  Suggestive terms 
may be registered as trademarks without proof of any secondary meaning.44 
A term is fanciful if it is derived solely for the purpose of its use as a 
trademark,45 while an arbitrary term is a term that is applied in an unusual 
or unfamiliar way.46  Fanciful and arbitrary terms are at the extreme end of 
the trademark distinctiveness spectrum and are accorded all of the rights 
that are given to suggestive terms as marks that require neither thought nor 
imagination in order to determine whether the term is simply descriptive.47 
Important consequences attach to a mark’s distinctiveness classification.  
In determining whether a plaintiff has demonstrated trademark 
infringement, courts consider several factors, including:  (1) strength of the 
mark, (2) similarity between the marks, (3) evidence of actual confusion, 
and (4) evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith.48  
Notably, a term that is generic or descriptive without a secondary meaning 
is not a valid mark and therefore will not be entitled to protection.49 
3.  Trademark Licensing Agreements:  Expanding the Scope 
and Reach of an Owner’s Brand 
Intellectual property licenses have proven to be significant in aiding the 
growth of industry.50  For both debtors and creditors, an intellectual 
property license may be a particularly valuable asset that is important to the 
continuing success of a company’s business.51  Even if a license plays a 
secondary role in the operation of a licensee’s business, the license will 
often remain essential to the business’s profitability and efficiency.52 
 
 43. See id. at 11 (providing a contrast between suggestive terms and descriptive terms, 
which convey “an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the 
goods” (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968))). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 11 n.12. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 11.  Examples of fanciful marks, which “are, in essence, made-up words 
expressly coined for serving as a trademark,” include Clorox, Kodak, Polaroid, and Exxon. 
Sarah Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996).  Examples of 
arbitrary marks include “Camel cigarettes” and “Apple computers.” Id. 
 48. See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polorad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. 
Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 49. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text; see also 1–2 LALONDE, supra note 
26, § 2.01. 
 50. For example, patent, copyright, and trade secret licenses have been important assets 
in the growth of the computer industry. Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the 
Bankruptcy Code:  A Licensee’s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 296 (1988) (stating 
that patents, copyrights, and trade secrets have been instrumental in the development of the 
computer industry). 
 51. See 9 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 18, § 177:37.  “An intellectual property 
license often lies at the core of a debtor’s business,” and the essence of the business itself 
may be the right to use the license in connection with the licensee’s goods and services. Id. 
 52. See id. 
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The Lanham Act authorizes the licensing of trademarks, acknowledging 
that related companies may validly enter into a trademark licensing 
agreement.53  A trademark licensing agreement provides a licensee with the 
right to use a trademark that is associated with specific products or services 
in a particular field within a designated geographic area in which the 
licensor is not currently using the trademark.54  A trademark licensor who 
grants a license to a licensee retains an interest in the mark and does not 
transfer all of its rights in the mark through the licensing agreement.55  For 
instance, if a licensee acquires any goodwill through the use of a license, all 
of these benefits will be passed along to the licensor.56 
In seeking to strengthen the impact of its brand, a trademark licensor will 
often include several important terms in its trademark licensing agreement.  
One fundamental element of a trademark licensing agreement is the 
identification of the scope of rights that the licensee will receive through the 
agreement.57  This provision identifies whether the license is exclusively 
licensed to one licensee or licensed nonexclusively to multiple licensees.58  
Under an exclusive license, even the licensor itself might not be permitted 
to use the license. 59  In a nonexclusive license, the licensor may still use the 
trademark on the products or services covered by the licensing agreement 
and may license the trademark to others.60  Exclusive licenses are 
particularly beneficial to a licensor because exclusive licenses tend to 
command higher royalty rates in comparison to nonexclusive licenses.61  
Furthermore, the goods and services offered under the trademark in an 
exclusive licensing agreement tend to consist of a higher level of quality 
than those licensed under a nonexclusive licensing agreement.62 
An additional element of a trademark licensing agreement is the 
compensation clause.63  Under the compensation clause, a trademark owner 
 
 53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). 
 54. See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 1275; see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:1 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that a trademark 
license is a “limited permit to another to use the trademark” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 55. See Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 56. See Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923 (C.D. 
Ill. 2000). 
 57. See R. Charles Henn Jr. et al., Trademark Licensing Basics, in KILPATRICK 
TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 69, 70–71 (6th ed. 
2011), available at http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/Publications/
IPDeskRefVolume6.ashx. 
 58. Id. at 70. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 70–71; see also Royalty Rates, IDEA BUYER (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.ideabuyer.com/news/royalty-rates/. 
 62. See Henn Jr. et al., supra note 57, at 70–71. 
 63. Id. at 71; see also Michael W. Rafter et al., Avoiding an “Accidental” Franchise in 
U.S. Trademark Licensing, INTABULLETIN (Int’l Trademark Ass’n, New York, NY), Jan. 
15, 2013, at 12, 13, available at http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Documents/
INTABulletinVol68No02.pdf. 
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may receive a flat fee or a royalty based on the use of the trademark.64  
Royalties are typically based on net sales,65 and royalty rates are often 
determined based on several factors including the trademark’s valuation.66 
Two other important elements of a trademark licensing agreement are the 
licensing term and quality control provisions.67 The licensing term 
provision states the duration of the license, allowing for either a fixed term 
of use or indefinite use.68  Once the term has elapsed, use of the licensed 
trademark by the former licensee will constitute trademark infringement.69 
Quality control, in which the licensor is obligated to control the quality of 
the products and services offered under the trademark, is also important in 
any trademark licensing agreement.70  If a trademark licensor does not 
maintain sufficient control over the goods and services licensed under the 
trademark, the license may be considered a “naked” or “uncontrolled” 
license.71  Trademark owners have a strong incentive to maintain the 
quality of licensed goods, because a “naked” or “uncontrolled” license may 
constitute the owner’s abandonment of the trademark.72 
A trademark owner may benefit from licensing its trademarks in several 
ways.  By licensing its trademark to another company, the trademark owner 
can gain increased revenue through royalty fees without the burdens of 
producing and advertising the product.73  Moreover, a trademark licensor 
can build the goodwill of its trademark by allowing the licensee to use the 
mark.74 
The United States is a leading worldwide market for licensed 
merchandise.75  In 2009, the U.S. market accounted for $83.15 billion 
 
 64. See Henn Jr. et al., supra note 57, at 71. 
 65. Id.; see also Joshua Kaufman, Royalty Rates:  Not As Simple As You May Think!, 
http://www.jjkaufman.com/articles/royaltyrates.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) 
(“[G]enerally, royalty rates are based on a net figure.”). 
 66. See GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING ROYALTY RATES 
§ 1.02 (2008) (noting that intellectual property may be valued based on market valuation). 
 67. See Henn Jr. et al., supra note 57, at 72. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 1280. 
 71. See Kevin Parks, Naked Is Not a Four-Letter Word:  Debunking the Myth of the 
“Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 534 
(1992).  In the absence of quality control, several detrimental effects might result, including 
the production of goods bearing the same mark but consisting of varying degrees of quality 
and consumer confusion or deception. See id. 
 72. See id.; see also Daniel K. Hampton, Trademark Owners Beware:  “Naked” 
Licensing Without Quality Control Can Result in Abandonment of Your Mark, HOLLAND & 
KNIGHT (Sept. 24, 2002), http://www.hklaw.com/publications/Trademark-Owners-Beware-
Naked-Licensing-Without-Quality-Control-Can-Result-In-Abandonment-of-Your-Mark--09-
24-2002/. 
 73. See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 1276. 
 74. See 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 1127 
(1975). 
 75. See Licensed Merchandise Sales Worldwide Down 10.8 Percent in ’09:  Properties 
from Chanel to Coca-Cola, Bakugan to Nate Berkus Span the Globe in Search of New Profit 
Opportunities, EPMCOM.COM (June 1, 2010), http://www.epmcom.com/public/Licensed
_Merchandise_Sales_Worldwide_Down_108_In_09_Properties_From_Chanel_To_CocaCol
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worldwide, which totaled 56 percent of global sales of licensed products.76  
In addition, U.S. public companies own more than $8 trillion in intellectual 
capital, which includes patents, trademarks, and copyrights.77  This 
provides strong support for the contention that intellectual property is “a 
lever for growth and innovation” in the economy.78  In the United States, 
well-known brands such as the Walt Disney Company have benefitted as 
their brand names have grown in value and companies have become 
increasingly willing to spend large amounts of money to license their 
brands.79 
Trademark licenses are particularly valuable sources of revenue for 
owners of the mark.80  Thus, trademark owners typically devote 
considerable amounts of money to advertising and promoting their 
trademarks.81  A trademark’s value is largely derived from its distinctive, 
rare characteristics, as well as its selling power.82 
Trademark licenses may also be essential to the thriving business of a 
licensee.  Because the trademark owner has an entrenched reputation for 
quality and goodwill generated from its brand name, the licensee is able to 
profit from the use of the trademark.83  If a licensor rejects the license in 
 
a_Bakugan_To_Nate_Berkus_Span_The_Globe_In_Search_Of_New_Profit_Opportunities.c
fm. 
 76. See id.  Despite holding the top ranking for licensed merchandise worldwide, 
however, U.S. sales of licensed merchandise dropped by 11.6 percent between 2008 and 
2009. See id. 
 77. Joff Wild, Introduction:  The Year It All Changed, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=f2e4b566-561e-4fca-b46b-
330b79ccb2c8 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Intellectual Property Licensing in the US Industry Market Research Report Now 
Available from IBISWorld, PRWEB (July 18, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/
2012/7/prweb9709974.htm [hereinafter Intellectual Property Licensing].  In 2010, the Walt 
Disney Company was the top-ranked global licensing company, with a reported $28.6 billion 
in total retail sales of licensed merchandise. See Tom Lisanti, Top 125 Global Licensors, 
LICENSE! GLOBAL, May 2011, at T3, T3, available at http://www.rankingthebrands.com/
PDF/Top%20125%20Global%20Licensors%202011,%20License%20Global.pdf.  The 
second-ranked company, Iconix Brand Group, generated $12 billion in retail sales of 
licensed merchandise in 2010—less than half of the revenue generated by the Walt Disney 
Group. See id. 
 80. See David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors 
and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 681 (1999) (stating that 
during the explosion of American industry in the early 1900s, it became evident that 
trademark licensing might allow companies the ability to increase the diversity of their 
products and maximize profits); Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 6, at 425 (“[A] prominent 
trademark is often the most valuable asset of a company.”). 
 81. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 6, at 425 (stating that owners of famous trademarks 
often spend millions of dollars with the goal of promoting the mark and building an “instant 
association” between the mark and the product in consumers’ minds).  Several companies 
spend billions of dollars annually in an attempt to protect their marks. See id. at 425 n.15 
(noting that in 1996, Proctor & Gamble spent $2.6 billion in advertising its products, while 
General Motors and Phillip Morris spent $2.37 billion and $2.28 billion, respectively). 
 82. See id. at 425 (citing Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831 (1927)). 
 83. Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, Merchandising Revisited, 76 
TRADEMARK REP. 271, 272 (1986) (noting that by placing a widely recognized trademark on 
256 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
bankruptcy, this decision may have disastrous consequences for the 
business of a licensee.84  Thus, the risks associated with rejection of a 
trademark licensing agreement may threaten the health of a business that is 
engaged in economically efficient and profitable business practices.85 
B.  Treatment of Executory Contracts  
Under the Bankruptcy Code 
This section addresses the intersection of intellectual property law with 
bankruptcy law in the context of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  It begins 
by describing the fundamental goals and policies underlying bankruptcy 
law.  It then considers a debtor’s avoiding powers under the Code.  Finally, 
this section concludes by examining § 365 of the Code and the results that 
follow from the rejection of executory contracts in bankruptcy. 
1.  Goals and Policies of Bankruptcy Law 
Bankruptcy law has several fundamental goals.  These goals include 
securing the prompt and efficient settlement of bankruptcy estates within a 
reasonable period of time,86 placing the bankrupt individual’s property 
under the control of the court for distribution among creditors,87 and 
protecting creditors from one another.88  Bankruptcy law also seeks to 
enable debtors to obtain a fresh start with full opportunity to shed 
burdensome obligations and carry on their businesses in a financially stable 
manner as soon as possible.89  Another important policy underlying the 
Bankruptcy Code is the consolidation of all matters relating to a bankruptcy 
case into one court, rather than conducting the litigation of matters in a 
piecemeal fashion.90 
The Bankruptcy Code was designed to resolve a debtor’s affairs rather 
than to hide them.91  The Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
 
property, a manufacturer may successfully create instant demand for his goods due to the 
goodwill that is already associated with the property); see also Intellectual Property 
Licensing, supra note 79 (stating that a licensee benefits from trademark licenses that allow 
the licensee to put names like “Disney” or “Nike” on its products due to increased exposure, 
loyalty from customers, and ability to charge a premium to customers). 
 84. David M. Jenkins, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!:  Trademark 
Licensing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 146 (1991) 
(stating that if a licensee’s entire business depends on a trademark license, the licensor’s 
rejection may destroy the licensee’s business); Scott W. Putney, Bankruptcy Code v. Lanham 
Act and Controlled Licensing, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 140, 155 (1990) (acknowledging that a 
licensee’s business might be destroyed due to the rejection of a trademark license). 
 85. See Jenkins, supra note 84, at 146. 
 86. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328–29 (1966). 
 87. In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 377 F.3d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting MacArthur 
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 88. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945). 
 89. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687 (1966) (stating that the policy behind 
Chapter 11 is the “ultimate rehabilitation of the debtor”); see also In re Chalasani, 92 F.3d 
1300, 1310 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 90. In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 369 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 91. See In re PRS Ins. Grp., Inc., 274 B.R. 381, 385 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
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Laws of the United States identified the primary function of the bankruptcy 
system as maintaining uniformity and order in the open credit economy 
despite a debtor’s difficulties repaying its debts to creditors.92  The Report 
further identified free access to the bankruptcy process by both the debtor 
and creditor,93 equitable treatment of claims asserted by creditors,94 
deterrence against fraudulent conduct,95 and enhanced knowledge regarding 
the outcomes of bankruptcy cases96 as goals of the bankruptcy process. 
The Bankruptcy Code is codified as Title 11 of the United States Code.97  
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code includes nine Chapters:  1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, and 15.98  Of particular relevance to this Note are Chapter 5, which 
concerns creditors, the debtor, and the estate,99 and Chapter 11, which 
addresses the restructuring and reorganization of businesses.100 
Under Chapter 11, the primary purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is the 
successful rehabilitation of the debtor.101  Thus, maximizing the value of 
the estate is of paramount importance in Chapter 11 proceedings.102  
Although rehabilitation of the debtor is a crucial goal in the reorganization 
process, creditors may not be disadvantaged in the preservation of the 
debtor’s business.103 
Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have been considered courts of equity104 
that enjoy broad equitable powers.105  As an equitable court, a bankruptcy 
 
 92. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 69 (1973). 
 93. Id. at 75. 
 94. Id. at 76. 
 95. Id. at 82. 
 96. Id. at 83. 
 97. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1977). 
 98. See In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 99. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–699 (2006). 
 100. See id. §§ 1101–1200. 
 101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); In re Bonner 
Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 915 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Conroe Forge & Mfg. Corp., 82 B.R. 781, 
784 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Killian Co., 19 B.R. 789, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). 
 102. See In re Shoen, 193 B.R. 302, 318 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 
B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that the purpose of the Code is to facilitate 
“the restructuring of debt and preservation of economic [value] rather than [the] dismantling 
of the estate”). 
 103. See In re Keeley & Grabanski Land P’ship, 460 B.R. 520, 538 (Bankr. D.N.D. 
2011). 
 104. See, e.g., Granfinanciara v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 81 (1989) (“[B]ankruptcy courts 
are inherently proceedings in equity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bank of Marin v. 
England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (noting the presence of an “overriding consideration that 
equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 308 (1939) (stating that, in exercising its equitable jurisdiction, the bankruptcy 
court has not only the power but the duty to see that injustice or unfairness is not done); In re 
Exquisito Servs., Inc., 823 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 
1443 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 105. See, e.g., In re Ranch House of Orange-Brevard, Inc., 773 F.2d 1166, 1169 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (refusing to limit a bankruptcy court’s power to utilize the equitable doctrines of 
estoppel and waiver); Gregory Germain, Due Process in Bankruptcy:  Are the New 
Automatic Dismissal Rules Constitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 547, 561 (2011) (“It often 
has been said that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, and they often have interpreted 
broadly their powers to do what is right and equitable.”). 
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court may devise novel remedies in circumstances in which those at law are 
inadequate.106  The traditional equitable powers of bankruptcy courts are 
codified in § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.107 
2.  Elusive Debtors:  Skirting Obligations Under the Code  
Through the Use of an Avoiding Power 
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee may set aside or avoid 
certain obligations of the debtor, including liens on the debtor’s property 
and transfers of property belonging to the debtor or the estate.108  The 
avoidance power does not refer to the right of a debtor to payment.  Instead, 
it provides a remedy to the trustee that invalidates otherwise legal 
transactions due to the bankruptcy execution process.109  A trustee may 
only use an avoiding power that is expressly specified in the Bankruptcy 
Code.110 
In practice, the avoidance power serves several important functions.  A 
debtor’s avoiding power significantly enhances the debtor’s ability to gain a 
fresh start.111  Moreover, the avoiding power prevents insolvent parties 
from disposing of their assets prior to the beginning of the bankruptcy 
period.112  Thus, the avoiding power thwarts the depletion of the 
bankruptcy estate by a debtor, thereby protecting creditors from debtors 
who seek to give away their remaining assets for little or no value.113 
In exercising its avoiding powers, a trustee must utilize its discretion 
regarding whether avoidance of a particular lien or other transfer is a 
prudent economic decision.114  Moreover, the trustee must consider the 
interests of the debtor’s creditors in utilizing its avoiding powers; the 
avoidance power should only be used for the benefit of creditors.115 
While the debtor may use its avoiding power in several different contexts 
specified in the Bankruptcy Code,116 the rejection of an executory contract 
does not constitute the use of an avoiding power.117  Once a debtor rejects 
an executory contract, the licensee receives a remedy for breach of the 
 
 106. See Chinichian, 784 F.2d at 1443. 
 107. In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 272 (D.R.I. 1987).  Section 105 states that a bankruptcy 
court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]. . . .  This subsection shall not be interpreted to 
exclude bankruptcy judges . . . from its operation.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), (c) (2006). 
 108. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(n), 506(d), 544–45, 547–49, 553(b), 724(a). 
 109. In re Morning Treat Coffee Co., 77 B.R. 62, 65 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987). 
 110. See In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 111. 9 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 18, § 56:26. 
 112. In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386, 392 (D. Idaho 1998). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc., 67 B.R. 899, 902 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1986). 
 115. See In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 117. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 700 n.20 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the rejection of an executory contract avoids the debtor’s 
commitment to perform the contract but does not constitute an avoiding power akin to the 
power found in §§ 544 and 545 of the Code). 
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contract, often in the form of a pre-petition, general unsecured claim against 
the bankrupt estate.118  However, rejection of an executory contract does 
not have any effect on the continued existence of the contract, and does not 
terminate the contract in any fashion.119  Therefore, rejection itself does not 
constitute an avoiding power, although bankruptcy law’s avoiding powers 
may operate to terminate rights in property stemming from a contract.120 
3.  Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy 
Under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-in-possession may choose 
to either assume or reject an executory contract.121  If a debtor assumes an 
executory contract, then performance under the contract continues without 
interruption and the rights between the contracting parties remain 
undisturbed.122  A debtor’s assumption of an executory contract allows the 
debtor, in its efforts for rehabilitation from other burdensome obligations, to 
enjoy the benefits of a contract that will be advantageous to its estate.123 
Under § 365(g)(2), if an assumed executory contract is breached, then the 
breach is treated as occurring at the time of the breach rather than pre-
petition.124  Therefore, a damages claim arising from the breach is treated as 
an administrative claim, which gives priority to the nondebtor over the 
debtor’s other creditors.125  Administrative claims are meant to encourage 
meaningful participation by creditors in the reorganization process 
following a debtor’s Chapter 11 filing.126 
Under § 365(a), a debtor may also reject an executory contract.127  If a 
debtor rejects an executory contract, § 502(g)(1)–(2) states that rejection 
acts as a breach of contract for which the remedy given to the nondebtor is 
damages.128  The Code’s treatment of executory contract rejection as a 
claim for damages enables the debtor to transfer the rights it previously held 
 
 118. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited:  A Reply to Professor 
Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 17. 
 121. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).  A debtor’s decision to assume or reject any 
executory contract will be “subject to the court’s approval.” See id.  If an executory contract 
is assumed or rejected, the entire contract must be assumed or rejected; partial assumption or 
rejection is not permitted under the Bankruptcy Code. See In re CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 327 
F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the election to assume or reject an executory 
contract is an “all-or-nothing proposition”). 
 122. See LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.03[2] (15th ed. 
1996).  Generally, an estate will assume a contract when it will receive a net benefit from 
performance of the contract.  An estate will therefore assume a contract when the cost to the 
debtor of performing its obligations under the contract is less than the value of the benefits 
that the nondebtor is obligated to provide to the debtor. See Andrew, supra note 118, at 3. 
 123. In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 225 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984). 
 124. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2). 
 125. Andrew, supra note 118, at 3. 
 126. See In re AmFin Fin. Corp., 468 B.R. 827, 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 128. See id. § 502(g)(1)–(2). 
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to the highest bidder.129  Thus, by permitting the debtor to reject an 
executory contract in bankruptcy, the debtor is given the power to replace 
the nondebtor’s contractual rights to the executory contract with a pre-
petition, general unsecured claim for ensuing damages under § 502(g) of the 
Code.130  Because the Bankruptcy Code places the nondebtor in the position 
of an unsecured creditor, the nondebtor will have a difficult time collecting 
the total amount of its damage claim and—depending on both the unsecured 
property remaining in the estate and the creditor’s priority relative to other 
unsecured creditors—will instead likely only receive a limited amount of its 
total claim.131 
The Code’s recognition of the right of a debtor to reject an executory 
contract furthers several fundamental objectives of bankruptcy law.132  
First, rejection permits a debtor to gain relief from burdensome restrictions 
imposed upon it by the rejected contract.133  Second, the rejection of an 
executory contract promotes two fundamental purposes of reorganization 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code:  to avoid the liquidation of a 
debtor’s assets, and to preserve the jobs and economic value generated by 
the debtor’s business operations.134 
In furtherance of these goals, § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a 
debtor-in-possession or trustee of a debtor’s estate to assume or reject any 
executory contract or unexpired lease held by the debtor.135  However, 
rejection may not occur under this provision unless the contract is 
executory.136  If the contract is not executory, the debtor may not reject it in 
bankruptcy.137  In addition, if an executory contract is not assumed pursuant 
 
 129. See Jeffrey R. Seul, Comment, License and Franchise Agreements As Executory 
Contracts:  A Proposed Amendment to Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 129, 146 (1988). 
 130. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g); see also In re Holmes Envtl., Inc., 287 B.R. 363, 389 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that a debtor that rejects an executory contract may be 
rewarded because rejection leaves the nondebtor with a general unsecured claim against the 
debtor). 
 131. See Seul, supra note 129, at 146–47; see also In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 429 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that, as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 502(g), “a claim resulting 
from the rejection of an executory contract does not give rise to a priority expense of 
administration”). 
 132. For a discussion of the fundamental objectives that underlie bankruptcy doctrine, see 
supra Part I.B.1. 
 133. Tamietti, supra note 50, at 299; see also Noreen M. Wiggins, The Intellectual 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act:  The Legislative Response to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 603, 603–04 (1990) 
(stating that an executory contract imposes substantial burdens on a debtor, reducing the 
likelihood that the debtor will succeed in obtaining a fresh start and paying its creditors, and 
that rejection allows the debtor to satisfy the maximum amount of debts possible). 
 134. Tamietti, supra note 50, at 299. 
 135. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 136. See 9 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 18, § 46:57 (stating that a trustee or debtor-in-
possession may not reject a contract unless the contract is executory). 
 137. See id. 
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to § 365 of the Code, the executory contract will not become an asset of the 
estate.138 
Several types of contracts have been deemed executory under the 
Bankruptcy Code, including gas and oil leases,139 franchise agreements,140 
partnership agreements,141 and collective bargaining agreements.142  To 
determine whether a contract is executory, courts must look beyond the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Code does not explicitly define the term “executory 
contract,”143 although the legislative history of § 365 does broadly address 
the term.144  Specifically, Congress observed that there is no precise 
definition of executory contracts,145 but noted that executory contracts are 
often understood to be agreements in which unperformed obligations 
remain due, to some extent, for the parties on both sides of the contract.146 
To determine whether a contract is executory such that it may be 
assumed or rejected in bankruptcy, most courts consider whether both sides 
still owe one another performance to some extent,147 and whether the 
failure of either party to perform its promised obligations would comprise a 
material breach, excusing performance of the other party.148  Thus, a 
contract will be deemed executory only if both parties still have material 
obligations that they have yet to perform.149  To be material, a breach must 
involve a failure to perform an act so important to the contract that leaving 
the act unperformed disregards an important purpose of the contract.150  If 
either party has rendered full performance, leaving only the payment of 
money due from the nonperforming party, the contract is executed rather 
than executory.151  Therefore, if one of the parties has performed all 
 
 138. In re Qintex Entm’t, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that an 
executory contract will not become property of a debtor’s estate unless it is assumed by the 
trustee in a timely manner). 
 139. See In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). 
 140. In re Tirenational Corp., 47 B.R. 647, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (stating that it is 
well established that a franchise agreement is an executory contract under § 365); see also In 
re Rovine Corp., 6 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980). 
 141. In re Silver, 26 B.R. 526, 529 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 142. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th Cir. 
1986). 
 143. 31 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 78:39 (4th ed. 1990). 
 144. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6303. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  The Supreme Court has adopted an identical definition of the term “executory 
contract.” See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984). 
 147. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347. 
 148. See 31 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 143, at § 78:39; see also Vern Countryman, 
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).  Most courts have 
applied this test to determine if a contract is executory. See, e.g., In re S. Pac. Funding Corp., 
268 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2001); Gallivan v. Springfield Post Rd. Corp., 110 F.3d 848, 851 
(1st Cir. 1997). 
 149. See In re Qintex Entm’t, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 150. See In re Holmes Envtl., Inc., 287 B.R. 363, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
 151. See In re Kmart Corp., 290 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).  A contract is not 
executory if a contracting party’s sole obligation remaining under the contract is the payment 
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material obligations under the contract, it is unlikely that the contract will 
be deemed executory, and the debtor will not be permitted to reject the 
contract.152 
Before approving the rejection of an executory contract, courts will also 
require the trustee or debtor-in-possession to demonstrate that rejection will 
benefit the estate.153  To decipher whether rejection will be beneficial to the 
estate, courts begin with the proposition that a decision by a bankrupt party 
must be given deference under the business judgment rule.154  The business 
judgment rule states that courts should refrain from interfering with 
decisions reached by corporate directors regarding affairs that are within 
their business judgment unless the directors have acted in bad faith or with 
gross abuse of discretion.155  The rule applies in the bankruptcy context to 
provide that a bankrupt party’s decision should be shown deference unless 
it is made in bad faith or with gross abuse of business discretion.156 
Not all executory contracts may be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code.  
While § 365(g)(1) provides for a damages remedy for the nondebtor 
following the rejection of an executory contract, § 365 also exempts certain 
types of contracts from rejection under the Code.157  For example, certain 
types of intellectual property licensees receive special protection under 
§ 365(n).158  However, the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a specific 
provision that explicitly addresses the rejection of executory trademark 
licensing agreements.159  Although the Code exempts certain forms of 
intellectual property from rejection under § 365(n), the Code’s definition of 
intellectual property does not include trademarks.160 
C.  Lubrizol and Congress’s Response in Passing the IPLBA 
This section summarizes the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lubrizol and 
considers Congress’s swift response in enacting the IPLBA.  The section 
begins by discussing the reasoning behind the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Lubrizol.  It then examines the content of the IPLBA as well as the 
justifications supporting its enactment.  Finally, this section explores the 
legislative history accompanying the IPLBA and the reasons Congress 
chose to exclude trademarks from coverage under the Act. 
 
of money. See Holmes, 287 B.R. at 390; In re Zenith Labs., Inc., 104 B.R. 667, 672 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1989). 
 152. See 9 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 18, § 46:57. 
 153. See In re Prestige Motorcar Gallery, Inc., 456 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 
2011). 
 154. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984) (stating that the 
business judgment rule is the traditional test). 
 155. See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
 158. See id. § 365(n).  For a full discussion of the special treatment that licensees of 
intellectual property receive under the Bankruptcy Code, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 159. Richard Lieb, The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 1, 36 (1990). 
 160. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Lubrizol:  A Harsh Result for Licensees 
The Bankruptcy Code treats the rejection of an executory contract as a 
breach of contract for which the nondebtor receives a pre-petition unsecured 
claim for damages.161  In Lubrizol, the Fourth Circuit described the 
consequences of the rejection of an intellectual property license in 
bankruptcy for the licensee of a licensed technology.162  Richmond Metal 
Finishers (RMF) entered into a contract with Lubrizol that provided 
Lubrizol with a nonexclusive license to use RMF’s metal-coating 
process.163  Under the contract, RMF owed Lubrizol several ongoing duties, 
which included notifying Lubrizol of any patent infringement suits against 
it, and any other use or licensing of the metal-coating process.164  RMF also 
was required, under a most favored nations clause, to reduce royalty rates 
under the agreement if the rates agreed upon with another licensee were 
lower than those RMF required Lubrizol to pay.165  In exchange, Lubrizol 
was obligated to keep track of and pay royalties for the use of the metal-
coating process.166 
Before Lubrizol had used the RMF technology, RMF filed for 
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.167  Under 
§ 365(a), RMF sought to reject the licensing agreement with Lubrizol.168  
The bankruptcy court determined that the contract between the parties was 
an executory contract and that the rejection of the contract would be 
advantageous to RMF.169  The district court reversed, stating that the 
contract was not executory and rejection of the contract would not be 
advantageous to the bankrupt party.170 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the technology licensing 
agreement was an executory contract because both sides had unperformed 
obligations that remained due to some extent.171  The court, applying 
Professor Countryman’s test for determining whether a contract is 
executory,172 concluded that the licensing agreement was executory 
because RMF owed Lubrizol the ongoing duties of informing Lubrizol of 
any further licensing of the metal-coating process, and decreasing 
Lubrizol’s royalty rate in the event that RMF granted more favorable rates 
to any subsequent licensees.173  RMF also owed Lubrizol the contingent 
 
 161. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1). 
 162. See 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 163. Id. at 1045. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Countryman, supra note 148; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 173. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045. 
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duties of providing notice of and defending patent infringement suits.174  A 
contingent obligation may still render a contract executory under § 365.175 
The Lubrizol court also concluded that Lubrizol had not performed a 
material obligation owed to RMF, because Lubrizol owed RMF the ongoing 
obligation of accounting for and paying royalties for the entirety of the 
agreement.176  This promise required Lubrizol to deliver written quarterly 
sales reports and keep books of account.177  Because Lubrizol entered into a 
promise that was more substantial than simply owing debt to another, it 
rendered the contract executory at the critical time.178 
The court next decided whether rejection of the executory contract under 
§ 365 would be advantageous to the bankrupt party.179  In deciding whether 
rejection would benefit the estate, the court applied the business judgment 
rule.180  The court determined that the debtor exercised sound business 
judgment in its decision to reject the executory contract.181 
In analyzing RMF’s rejection of the intellectual property licensing 
agreement with Lubrizol, the court concluded that RMF was entitled to 
“deprive Lubrizol of all rights to the process.”182  Essentially, the court 
treated rejection as a breach of contract.  As a remedy for the breach, the 
court held that § 365(g) entitles a nonbreaching party to monetary damages 
rather than specific performance, regardless of whether or not such a 
remedy would typically be given following the breach of an intellectual 
property licensing agreement.183  In reaching this decision, the Lubrizol 
court stressed that the legislative history of § 365(g) clearly established that 
the purpose of § 365(g) is to allow the licensee to recover only a damages 
remedy.184  The Lubrizol decision thus prompted deep concerns for 
 
 174. Id. at 1046. 
 175. See In re O.P.M. Servs., Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that 
the duty to defend an infringement suit renders a contract executory as to the promisor). 
 176. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  Notably, a contract is not executory if the contract simply requires a party to pay 
money to the other party. See In re Smith Jones, Inc. 26 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1982). 
 179. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046. 
 180. See id. at 1047; supra notes 154–56. 
 181. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047–48. 
 182. Id. at 1048. 
 183. See id.  Under this remedy, the nonbreaching party’s claim is treated as a pre-
petition, general unsecured claim against the breaching party’s estate for which the licensee 
will likely receive only a miniscule proportion of the total damage claim from the 
distribution to the estate’s unsecured creditors. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying 
text. 
 184. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 351 (1977), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303.  The Lubrizol court further stated that specific 
performance was not an appropriate remedy because allowing such a remedy would frustrate 
the primary purpose of rejection under § 365(a). Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.  The court 
therefore refused to embrace a reading of congressional intent that provided for specific 
performance as a remedy. Id. at 1048. 
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intellectual property licensees, who feared that their licenses might be 
unilaterally terminated following a debtor’s bankruptcy filing.185 
2.  The Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act:  Exempting 
Certain Forms of Intellectual Property from § 365 
In response to Lubrizol, Congress passed the IPLBA in 1988, which is 
now codified in § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.186  The IPLBA provides 
special treatment for executory contracts involving licensing rights to 
intellectual property.187  While § 365(n) expressly includes copyrights and 
patents under its definition of intellectual property, the Code notably does 
not recognize trademarks.188 
The IPLBA prevents a licensor from unilaterally terminating the right of 
a licensee to continue using an intellectual property license once the 
licensor rejects the license under § 365(a) of the Code.189  Instead, when the 
licensor rejects an intellectual property license, the licensor is no longer 
required to perform any future obligations, and the licensee may either treat 
the contract as terminated or elect to continue utilizing the licensed 
intellectual property.190 
If the licensee treats the contract as terminated, it may assert a breach of 
contract claim against the debtor’s estate for damages arising from the 
rejection.191  Under this option, the licensee would waive all rights to 
continue utilizing the license, and the breach of contract claim would be 
treated as a general unsecured claim against the estate.192 
If upon the licensor’s rejection, the licensee elects instead to continue 
utilizing the licensed intellectual property, § 365(n) permits the licensee to 
retain all rights under both the contract and any supplementary agreements 
reached under the contract as they existed prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy 
filing.193  The legislative history accompanying § 365(n) clarifies that when 
a licensor rejects an intellectual property license, the licensor is not required 
 
 185. See Jeffrey W. Levitan, ‘Sunbeam’ Protects Trademark Licensees, but Questions 
Remain, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 2012, at S8 (stating that Lubrizol sent “shock waves throughout 
the business community” as uncertainty ensued over the effects of bankruptcy on the 
continued use of intellectual property licenses); Christopher Linden, Seventh Circuit’s Take 
on Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code:  What’s the Point?, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (July 24, 
2012), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/executory-contracts/seventh-circuits-
take-on-section-365n-of-the-bankruptcy-code-whats-the-point/#axzz26fhKgUw0 (noting 
that Lubrizol “kept the licensee community up at night” because the decision permitted a 
debtor to strip a licensee of its rights to use an intellectual property license following 
rejection). 
 186. See Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 
2538 (1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006)). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. § 101(35A); supra note 11. 
 189. See id. § 365(n). 
 190. Id. § 365(n)(1)(A), (B). 
 191. See id. §§ 365(g), 502(g). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. § 365(n)(1)(B). 
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to exert any affirmative performance.194  However, the licensor remains 
obligated to provide the licensee with access to existing intellectual 
property without interfering with the licensee’s rights to the property.195 
3.  Concerns Behind the Passage of the IPLBA:   
Legislative History and Business Justifications 
In enacting the IPLBA, Congress acted in response to its concern that 
Lubrizol would have a detrimental effect on technological development.196  
The Senate stressed that intellectual property licensing was crucial to the 
development of technology and innovation.197  The Senate further noted 
that technological development and innovation include research, 
development, manufacturing, and marketing.198  These activities require 
financing and additional refinement that often may only be procured 
through contributions from people who are not the original innovators.199  
Thus, licensing is often a key mechanism for an original innovator who 
seeks to reap financial rewards.200 
The Senate expressed particular concern that licensing agreement 
instability resulting from § 365 was beginning to introduce undesirable 
consequences.201  Licensees, who previously were content to accept 
licenses granting the licensee the right to use the license, were pressured to 
demand assignments from licensors, which constituted the transfer of a full 
ownership interest in the intellectual property.202  The Senate felt that this 
shift from licensing to assigning was wasteful, inefficient, and particularly 
burdensome to small businesses in the technology industry.203  To combat 
these concerns, Congress enacted the IPLBA, seeking to clarify that 
intellectual property licensees retain their rights to use licensed intellectual 
 
 194. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 1–2 (noting that several recent court decisions, including Lubrizol, have 
interpreted § 365 in a way that Congress did not intend, therefore leading to negative 
consequences for technological development in the United States).  Due to the interpretation 
of § 365 endorsed by Lubrizol and subsequent courts, the technological licensing industry 
began to decline. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations 
Concerning the Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470 
(1997) [hereinafter Westbrook, Commission’s Recommendations] (stating that Lubrizol’s 
impact on the licensing community was “immediate and awful”); see also Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 306–07 
(1989) (stating that Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) in response to industry concerns 
that Lubrizol permitted any intellectual property licensor to file for Chapter 11 and reject a 
perfectly valid license). 
 197. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id.  The Senate further declared that the change from licensing to assigning 
intellectual property licenses constituted a sincere threat to the creative process associated 
with technological innovation in the United States. See id. 
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property and that these rights cannot be unilaterally terminated following a 
debtor’s rejection of a license in bankruptcy under § 365.204 
Congress had several goals in mind in passing the IPLBA.  Through the 
Act, Congress aimed to benefit licensees by encouraging the continued 
practice of technology licensing, and by ensuring that an intellectual 
property licensee is not stripped of its rights under the contract following a 
licensor’s rejection.205  Congress also sought to benefit licensors by 
permitting debtors to reject executory contracts while also allowing them to 
encourage other parties to continue to engage in business with them 
following bankruptcy—something these parties would otherwise likely 
refuse to do.206  Furthermore, Congress enacted the IPLBA in response to 
Lubrizol’s effects on the willingness of licensees to contract with 
companies in financial distress.207 
While Congress responded quickly to Lubrizol “in support of the 
intellectual property license as a vehicle for furthering America’s 
technology industry,”208 the omission of trademarks from the IPLBA’s 
listed definition of intellectual property209 called into question whether 
trademark licensees should be afforded the same protections that copyright 
and patent licensees are provided under the Act. 
In enacting § 365(n), Congress considered including trademarks within 
the scope of the section’s protections, noting that the rejection of trademark 
licenses was worrisome because of Lubrizol and other courts’ interpretation 
of § 365.210  Rather than include trademark licenses under the definition of 
intellectual property, however, Congress decided not to address the concern, 
stating that it could not reach a decision on this matter “without more 
extensive study.”211  Instead, Congress chose to postpone action and allow 
bankruptcy courts, through the exercise of their equitable powers, to craft a 
resolution to this issue.212 
Several other reasons supported Congress’s decision to exclude 
trademarks from protection under the IPLBA.  For one, Congress was 
concerned that the IPLBA would constrain technological development that 
 
 204. See id. at 1. 
 205. See Michael J. Shpizner, Congress Passes New Legislation Protecting Licensees of 
Intellectual Property, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 177, 179 (1989). 
 206. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 954–55 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 207. See Wiggins, supra note 133, at 606–07 (stating that Lubrizol caused companies to 
become increasingly careful and thorough in checking the financial status of potential 
licensors, particularly if the intellectual property license comprised a large percentage of the 
licensee’s earnings). 
 208. See Shpizner, supra note 205, at 178. 
 209. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (“[The 
IPLBA] does not address the rejection of executory trademark, trade name or service mark 
licenses by debtor-licensors.”). 
 210. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id.; see also In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) 
(interpreting the legislative history accompanying § 365(n) as signifying that “the ball is 
back in the Court’s court”). 
268 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
is more closely associated with patents and other intellectual property.213  In 
addition, the Senate Report further indicates that Congress felt that 
agreements to license trademarks are unique, because they rely heavily on 
the licensor’s quality control of products and services sold under the 
trademark.214 
II.  THE FOURTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS SPLIT:  POST-REJECTION  
RIGHTS RETAINED BY TRADEMARK LICENSEES 
Part II examines the circuit split between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
concerning whether a trademark licensee may continue to retain the right to 
use the license following rejection.  This Part begins by addressing the 
position articulated by Lubrizol and subsequent courts, in which rejection of 
an intellectual property license extinguishes the licensee’s right to continue 
utilizing the license.  It concludes by considering viewpoints that contrast 
with Lubrizol, primarily focusing on the reasoning articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit in the Sunbeam decision. 
A.  The Fourth Circuit:  Rejection Extinguishes a Licensee’s  
Right To Continue Utilizing Licensed Technology 
This section first discusses the rationale underlying Lubrizol and other 
decisions reached prior to Congress’s enactment of the IPLBA.  It then 
considers the judicial interpretation of the rights retained by trademark 
licensees following rejection in light of Lubrizol and the enactment of the 
IPLBA. 
1.  Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.  
and Other Pre-IPLBA Cases 
In Lubrizol, the Fourth Circuit held that a licensor’s rejection of a patent 
license constituted a breach of contract for which the licensee was entitled 
to a pre-petition claim for damages rather than specific performance.215  
The Lubrizol court determined that a licensor of an intellectual property 
license may reject the license in bankruptcy, thereby eliminating the right of 
the licensee to continue utilizing the licensed technology.216  The court also 
noted that rejection of licensing contracts as executory imposes severe 
 
 213. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2–5. But see Jenkins, supra note 84, at 160–61 (asserting 
that this justification is inadequate because trademarks serve an equally important function in 
the economy, and a licensee’s loss of trademark licensing rights also has a detrimental effect 
on the development of both technology and industry). 
 214. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2–5. But see Jenkins, supra note 84, at 161 (stating that a 
licensor’s obligation of quality control is not relevant to the IPLBA’s exemption of 
trademarks, because Congress chose to protect patent licensees under the Act even though 
patent licensing agreements also often require duties on the part of the licensor).  For further 
discussion of a licensor’s quality control duties under trademark licensing agreements, see 
supra notes 70–72. 
 215. See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 
(4th Cir. 1985).  For an in-depth discussion of the Lubrizol decision, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 216. See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
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burdens on contracting parties.217  The court further acknowledged that 
allowing rejection in these types of cases might result in a general chilling 
effect on technology licensing because potential licensees might have 
serious reservations about entering into deals with companies facing 
financial difficulties.218 
However, the court stated that equitable considerations—such as the 
chilling effect of rejection—are not relevant to the analysis of executory 
intellectual property agreements.219  Rather, the court held that technology 
licensees do not receive any special treatment under the Code,220 
concluding that such licensees “share the general hazards created by § 365 
for all business entities dealing with potential bankrupts.”221 
Lubrizol profoundly impacted subsequent decisions relating to the 
rejection of intellectual property agreements,222 such as In re Logical 
Software, Inc.223  In this case, Logical Software, Inc. (Logical) entered into 
a software licensing agreement with Infosystems Technology Inc. (ITI), 
granting ITI the exclusive rights of distribution for its LOGIX technology 
on certain computers.224  The relationship between the companies became 
problematic, which precipitated Logical’s Chapter 11 filing to relieve itself 
of the burdens stemming from the contract between the parties.225 
Relying heavily on Lubrizol, the bankruptcy court held that Logical was 
permitted to reject the agreement because Logical exercised its sound 
business judgment.226  The court applied the business judgment rule despite 
the fact that ITI’s development and marketing of the licensing agreement 
accounted for all of its earnings.227  Despite the high likelihood that 
rejection would destroy the licensee’s business,228 the court cited Lubrizol 
in support of its decision permitting the rejection of the license, noting that 
Lubrizol obviates any analysis of equitable considerations.229 
Subsequent decisions have applied Lubrizol in the trademark licensing 
context in support of the conclusion that § 365 is meant to exclude 
trademarks from its protection.  In one such decision, In re Chipwich, 
Inc.,230 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
interpreted § 365 prior to Congress’s enactment of § 365(n).231  On 
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 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Wiggins, supra note 133, at 613 (noting that Lubrizol has been significantly 
relied upon regardless of Congress’s amendment to the Bankruptcy Code in § 365(n)). 
 223. 66 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). 
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reliance on the LOGIX license. See id. 
 228. See Wiggins, supra note 133, at 613. 
 229. See Logical Software, 66 B.R. at 687. 
 230. 54 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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September 20, 1983, Chipwich, Inc. (Chipwich) entered into a licensing 
agreement with Farmland Dairies, Inc. (Farmland), in which Farmland was 
given an exclusive license in the United States to produce, sell, and 
distribute eggnog and flavored milk under the “Chipwich” trademark.232  
Eight days later, the companies entered into a similar agreement in which 
Farmland was given worldwide rights to sell and distribute a dairy shake 
product under the “Chipwich” trademark.233  After Chipwich filed for 
bankruptcy, it sought to reject the two licenses because Farmland was not 
operating at a satisfactory level under the licenses, and Chipwich felt that it 
would be more lucrative to allow additional companies to utilize the rights 
to the license.234 
The court first sought to determine whether the contract between the 
parties was executory under § 365(a).235  The court concluded that the 
contract was executory as to both parties because both parties had material 
obligations that they had not yet performed.236 
Next, the court considered whether Chipwich was entitled to reject the 
executory contract.237  Citing Lubrizol, the court held that Farmland was 
permitted to treat the rejection of the contract as a breach for damages under 
§ 365(g) and § 502(g).238  The court stressed that there was no showing that 
the damages incurred by Farmland would be disproportionate to the 
benefits accrued by the debtor and the estate’s general creditors by shedding 
this burdensome obligation.239  Therefore, the debtor was permitted to 
terminate the licensee’s rights to utilize the trademark on its goods.240 
2.  Post-IPLBA:  Reasoning by Negative Implication  
To Exclude Trademarks from Protection 
Following the Lubrizol and Chipwich decisions, Congress enacted the 
IPLBA in 1988.241  In applying § 365(n), courts have routinely relied on the 
plain language of the provision, reasoning by negative inference that 
trademarks should not be included under the protections of § 365, rather 
 
 232. Id. at 428. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 429. 
 235. See id. 
 236. Id. at 430.  Chipwich had the continuing obligations to notify Farmland of any 
infringements of the licensed trademarks, to ensure that any such infringements did not 
continue, and to indemnify Farmland for any damages resulting from such suits. See id.  In 
addition, Farmland had the continuing duty to pay royalties to Chipwich for the entirety of 
the agreement. See id. 
 237. See id. at 430–31. 
 238. Id. at 431. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 
2538 (1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006)).  For a detailed discussion of the 
IPLBA, see supra Part I.C.2. 
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than delving further into equitable considerations relating to rejection of 
trademark licenses.242 
In In re Centura Software Corp.,243 the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of California reasoned by negative inference to conclude 
that the IPLBA was not meant to extend protection to trademark licensees 
following the rejection of the license in bankruptcy.244  In Centura, Raima 
Corporation (Raima U.S.) licensed the trademarks associated with its 
software products to Raima UK Limited (Raima U.K.) for use in the United 
Kingdom market.245  A merger soon followed, in which Centura Software 
Corporation (Centura U.S.) acquired all of the rights to Raima U.S.’s 
software and trademarks.246  Approximately two years later, Centura U.S. 
filed a Chapter 11 petition, terminating the trademark agreement with 
Raima U.K. because Raima U.K. had not paid the minimum licensing 
fees.247 
In seeking to determine whether the licensee may continue to utilize the 
license after the rejection of a trademark licensing agreement, the court 
noted the absence of any reported cases purporting to directly interpret 
§ 365(n) in the context of the rejection of trademark licensing 
agreements.248  However, the court asserted that the plain language of 
§ 365(n) indicates that the provision is not meant to include trademark 
licenses.249 
To support its conclusion that the plain language of the IPLBA excludes 
trademark licenses from its protection, the court resorted to an interpretation 
of §§ 365(n) and 101(35A).250  The court explained that § 365(n) allows the 
licensee to retain its rights if the rejected license is intellectual property.251  
However, § 101(35A) states that intellectual property “means” several 
different types of intellectual property, but does not include trademarks in 
this listed definition.252  Therefore, the court stated that Congress’s decision 
to use the “more limiting term ‘means’ instead of ‘includes’” demonstrated 
that Congress acted deliberately in only extending protection to the forms of 
intellectual property explicitly enumerated under § 101(35A).253 
 
 242. See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 966 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring) 
(stating that “courts have reasoned by negative inference” that Congress’s omission of 
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Although the court acknowledged that the legislative history 
accompanying § 365(n) might indicate that Congress embraced the 
consideration of equitable factors with respect to trademark rejection, it 
concluded that an inquiry into the legislative history was unnecessary 
because the language of § 365(n) is unambiguous.254  Thus, while noting 
that its decision may result in harsh consequences for the licensee, the court 
held that a licensee may not continue to utilize a trademark once the license 
has been rejected.255 
Similarly, in In re HQ Global Holdings,256 the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware considered the effects resulting from a licensor’s 
decision to reject executory trademark licensing agreements.  HQ Global 
Holdings, Inc. (HQ Global) sought to reject licensing agreements that it had 
entered into with franchisees that granted the franchisees exclusive use of 
trademarks, trade names, and logos.257  In interpreting § 365 in conjunction 
with § 101(35A), the court concluded that trade names and trademarks were 
deliberately excluded from the Code’s definition of intellectual property.258  
Therefore, the franchisees were not protected under § 365(n) and were left 
with only a claim for damages resulting from rejection under § 365(g)(1).259  
As a consequence, the franchisees’ rights to use the marks were 
extinguished.260 
B.  Casting Aside Lubrizol:  The Seventh Circuit Expands the Rights of 
Trademark Licensees Following Rejection 
This section examines viewpoints that oppose Lubrizol’s contention that 
rejection of an intellectual property license extinguishes the licensee’s 
rights under the contract.  It begins by explaining the role that equitable 
considerations might play in determining the rights that licensees will retain 
under a contract following rejection of a licensing agreement.  It then 
considers the argument that Congress did not use reasoning by negative 
implication to withdraw the rights of a trademark licensee to continue 
utilizing the license following rejection.  The section concludes by 
considering the Seventh Circuit’s response to Lubrizol in Sunbeam 
Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC. 
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 260. Id. 
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1.  The Role of Equitable Principles in License Rejection 
Scholars have widely criticized Lubrizol, asserting that it mistakenly 
confuses rejection with the use of an avoiding power.261  Because courts 
have found themselves bound by the plain language of § 365(n) without 
consideration of policy or equitable factors, the judicial consensus has 
become that the statute has been applied in an inequitable manner, resulting 
in harsh consequences for intellectual property licensees.262  In fact, the 
IPLBA was enacted in direct response to the inequitable interpretation of 
§ 365 in cases such as Lubrizol and Chipwich.263 
In his concurring opinion in In re Exide Technologies,264 Judge Ambro of 
the Third Circuit considered the importance of equitable considerations in 
determining whether the rejection of a trademark license terminates the 
right of the licensee to continue utilizing the license following the 
rejection.265  In that case, Exide filed a petition for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to reject several agreements it 
had with EnerSys.266  One of these agreements included a trademark and 
trade name licensing agreement in which Exide licensed its “Exide” 
trademark to EnerSys for use in its industrial battery business.267  Because 
Exide desired to continue to use the trademark outside of the industrial 
battery business, Exide agreed to provide EnerSys with an exclusive, 
royalty-free, indefinite license to use the Exide trademark in the industrial 
battery business.268  After ten years of abiding by this agreement, Exide 
sought to reenter the industrial battery market.269  EnerSys, however, 
refused to relinquish control of the Exide trademark.270  Consequently, in 
an attempt to regain control of the Exide trademark, Exide filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11, rejecting the trademark agreement.271 
The Third Circuit proceeded to analyze whether the contract between the 
two parties was an executory contract.272  As noted above, if an agreement 
is not an executory contract, the debtor is not permitted to reject the contract 
 
 261. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012) (noting that scholars have “uniformly criticize[d]” 
Lubrizol).  For a discussion of the debtor’s avoiding powers under the Bankruptcy Code, see 
supra Part I.B.2. 
 262. See Darren W. Saunders, Should the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Be Amended To Protect 
Trademark Licenses?, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 934, 939 (2004); see also Centura, 281 B.R. at 
673 (“Lubrizol’s harsh holding controls.”). 
 263. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200 (stating 
that rejection of trademark licenses is “of concern because of the interpretation of § 365 by 
the Lubrizol court and others . . . [such as] In re Chipwich”).  For a discussion of the 
Lubrizol and Chipwich analyses of § 365, see supra Part II.A.1. 
 264. 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 265. See id. at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 266. Id. at 960 (majority opinion). 
 267. Id. at 960–61. 
 268. Id. at 961. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. at 962–64. 
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under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.273  The court concluded that the 
agreement between Exide and EnerSys did not constitute an executory 
contract because EnerSys did not have any material obligations that it had 
yet to perform.274  Therefore, because the agreement was not executory, 
Exide was not permitted to reject the contract.275 
Judge Ambro concurred in the result, but took issue with the bankruptcy 
court’s determination below that rejection of the agreement terminated 
EnerSys’s right to utilize the trademark.276  Rather, Judge Ambro advocated 
for the position that rejection of a trademark agreement by a trademark 
licensor under § 365 does not necessarily rescind or terminate the rights of 
the licensee to use the trademark.277 
In the course of his analysis, Judge Ambro considered Lubrizol’s 
interpretation of intellectual property license rejection under § 365.278  
Judge Ambro noted that the Lubrizol court acknowledged that its 
interpretation of rejection under § 365 might cause a chilling effect upon the 
willingness of parties to enter into contracts with financially unstable 
businesses.279  Moreover, Judge Ambro noted that the Lubrizol court 
refused to analyze equitable considerations in examining a contract in 
which a debtor has rejected an intellectual property license.280 
Judge Ambro disagreed with this analysis, stating that the court should 
have used its powers as an equitable court to provide Exide with a fresh 
start without depriving EnerSys of its rights to utilize the Exide 
trademark.281  Thus, according to Judge Ambro, while courts may apply 
§ 365 to provide relief from burdensome duties that may hinder a bankrupt 
trademark licensor’s attempts at reorganization,282 the court may not use 
§ 365 to permit the licensor to retrieve trademark rights it bargained away.  
Providing such rights to trademark licensors, Judge Ambro felt, would 
render “bankruptcy more a sword than a shield, putting debtor-licensors in a 
catbird seat they often do not deserve.”283 
 
 273. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 274. Exide, 607 F.3d at 964.  For a discussion of the material obligations test utilized by 
the court to determine whether this was an executory contract, see supra notes 143–52. 
 275. See Exide, 607 F.3d at 964. 
 276. See id. at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring) (citing In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222, 250 
(Bankr. Del. 2006)).  The bankruptcy court further noted that Congress certainly might have 
chosen to recognize trademarks under § 365(n) but instead decided not to include them 
within the Act’s protections.  Therefore, the court stated that rejection terminates the rights 
of a trademark licensee to continue utilizing the license, and the licensee is left with an 
unsecured claim for damages. Exide, 340 B.R. at 250 n.40. 
 277. See Exide, 607 F.3d at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 278. See id. at 965–66.  For an expanded discussion of Lubrizol, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 279. Exide, 607 F.3d at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring) (citing Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. at 967–68. 
2013] SUNBEAM:  A RAY OF HOPE 275 
Likewise, in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co.,284 the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Western District of Washington carefully considered the balance of 
equities in determining whether to permit the rejection of a licensing 
agreement following the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  The debtor, Petur 
U.S.A. Instruments Co., (Petur U.S.A.), entered into a licensing agreement 
with Petur Instruments, Ltd. (Petur of Canada), which provided Petur of 
Canada with the exclusive right to utilize, manufacture, assemble, and sell 
Petur U.S.A.’s inventions in Canada.285  Petur of Canada’s entire business 
and income stemmed from the licensing agreement with Petur U.S.A.286  
However, Petur U.S.A. was in financial distress and felt that the agreement 
between it and Petur of Canada was the primary reason for its financial 
difficulties.287  Petur U.S.A. therefore sought to reject the license under 
§ 365.288 
In response to Petur U.S.A.’s Chapter 11 filing, the court determined that 
the debtor properly exercised its business judgment in rejecting the 
licensing agreement because the company decided that rejection would be 
in the best interest of the company, as well as its creditors.289  However, the 
court observed that if it granted Petur U.S.A.’s motion, Petur of Canada 
would be forced out of business because its entire business depended on the 
licensing agreement.290  Thus, relying upon legal as well as equitable 
considerations, the court refused to authorize the rejection of the licensing 
agreement between the parties.291 
In In re Matusalem,292 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Florida confronted facts similar to those in Petur.  In Matusalem, Matusa, a 
Cuban manufacturer of high-quality rum, granted a franchise to Licorera, 
providing it worldwide rights to sell Matusalem rum under Matusa 
trademarks.293  Due to purported breaches of the franchise agreement, 
Matusa sought to terminate the subfranchise agreement, thereby rejecting 
the trademark licensing agreements.294 
 
 284. 35 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). 
 285. Id. at 562. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 563. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id.  To justify its decision, the court reiterated that it is commonly understood that 
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. Id.  The court stated that permitting rejection of the 
licensing agreement would not only result in the disappointment of legitimate expectations, 
but also would ruin an otherwise profitable business. Id.  The court concluded that 
destruction of such a business would not be permitted under equitable considerations. Id. But 
see In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 687 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (applying the 
business judgment rule to permit the rejection of a licensing agreement, despite the fact that 
the licensee derived 100 percent of its earnings from the license and noting that Lubrizol 
does not authorize a balancing of the equities). 
 292. 158 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 293. Id. at 517. 
 294. Id. at 518–19. 
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Applying equitable principles, the Matusalem court determined that in 
seeking to reject the licensing agreements, Matusa did not exercise sound 
business judgment.295  The court reasoned that rejection of the licenses 
would serve no economic benefit to the debtor’s estate or to the unsecured 
creditors.296  In addition, the court held that rejection was not permissible 
because the case was likely filed in bad faith, and rejection would destroy 
the licensor’s business.297 
2.  Reasoning by Negative Implication:  An Insufficient Basis for 
Excluding Trademarks from the IPLBA’s Protections 
In his concurring opinion in Exide, Judge Ambro also disagreed with the 
practice of utilizing reasoning by negative inference to conclude that, 
because Congress did not explicitly include trademarks under its § 365(n) 
protection, Lubrizol’s holding controls when a licensor rejects a trademark 
license.298  The legislative history of § 365(n) explicitly states that 
trademarks were not addressed.299  Instead, Congress postponed action by 
deferring to the bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to craft a 
resolution.300 
Moreover, the legislative history notes that in enacting § 365(n), 
Congress did not intend for any inference to be drawn pertaining to the 
treatment of executory contracts that do not relate to intellectual 
property.301  Judge Ambro noted that this statement may have been 
included in the legislative history as a result of the recommendation by the 
National Bankruptcy Conference that the legislative history should contain 
a caveat that clearly indicates that “no negative inferences are to be drawn 
 
 295. Id. at 522 (stating that Matusa did not exercise good or even mediocre business 
judgment). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id.  The court further stated that the debtor had no existing business to reorganize, 
and that the case represented an effort by the debtor “to obtain vengeance . . . and create a 
new business on the ashes of the franchisee.” Id. 
 298. See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 966 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring).  
For a discussion of the district courts’ practice of utilizing reasoning by negative inference in 
support of the Lubrizol holding, see supra Part II.A.2.  Several courts have embraced this 
reasoning technique in reaching a conclusion regarding the rights retained by a trademark 
licensee following rejection. See, e.g., In re Old Carco, LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code does not recognize trademarks as 
intellectual property, so a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license terminates the right of the 
licensee to use the mark); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2003) (reasoning that because the Bankruptcy Code excludes trademarks from its definition 
of intellectual property, Lubrizol controls and franchisees may not continue utilizing a 
trademark following rejection); In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 674–75 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2002) (observing that because § 365(n) “plainly excludes trademarks,” a licensee 
does not retain any rights in the licensed trademark following rejection). 
 299. See Exide, 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 
5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204).  For a complete discussion of the 
legislative history accompanying § 365(n), see supra Part I.C.3. 
 300. See Exide, 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 
5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204); supra Part I.C.3. 
 301. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5. 
2013] SUNBEAM:  A RAY OF HOPE 277 
or should be drawn by courts that, because Congress has legislated in a 
particular way a licensing agreement, those other agreements that are not 
within the parameters of the legislation are to be dealt with in any particular 
way.”302  Judge Ambro therefore concluded that such direct statements of 
Congress’s intent signify that it is unreasonable to construe rejection of a 
trademark license as yielding the same result as termination of the right to 
continue using the license.303 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc.304 
further supports the conclusion that reasoning by negative inference will not 
justify treating the rejection of a trademark license as extinguishing the 
rights of the licensee. In Thompkins, the court rejected the debtor’s 
argument that the purpose of § 365 is to permit the debtor to effectively 
rescind the contract, placing the parties back in their precontract 
positions.305  Instead, the court asserted that rejection simply frees the estate 
from its obligation to perform its duties under the contract.306 
Under this view, rejection does not terminate the rights of both parties 
under the contract.307  Equating rejection with the use of an avoiding power 
would therefore be mistaken.308  Instead, rejection signifies the estate’s 
decision to refrain from continuing to be bound by the contract because the 
contract is no longer beneficial to it.309  The effect of rejection is to provide 
a remedy to the nondebtor for breach of contract, typically in the form of a 
general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case.310  Rejection does not have 
 
 302. See Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy:  Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before 
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 101 (1988) (statement of George Hahn, Esq., National Bankruptcy Conference). 
 303. See Exide, 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 304. 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.; see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that rejection does not lead to the disappearance of the contract). 
 307. Andrew, supra note 118, at 22; see also Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy:  Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 918 (1988) (stating that 
the licensee in Lubrizol had what appeared to be a valid license and that there was no reason 
to conclude that the license was terminable or avoidable in any way); Lieb, supra note 159, 
at 36–37 (suggesting that rejection should not allow for trademark licensing rights to be 
rescinded, but should instead allow the licensee to continue utilizing the trademark). 
 308. Analyzing rejection under § 365 as the use of an avoiding power is problematic for 
several reasons.  First, the legislative record demonstrates that each time Congress has 
considered the effects of the avoiding-power-rejection doctrine, it has disapproved the 
doctrine by enacting specific provisions. Andrew, supra note 118, at 11.  Second, the 
legislative record contains no evidence that Congress ever considered, let alone approved, 
the avoiding-power-rejection doctrine. See id.  Third, other provisions under § 365 are not 
interpreted through reasoning by negative implication, as § 365 would have to be interpreted, 
in order to conclude that trademarks do not fall within the protections afforded by the 
IPLBA. See id.  For further discussion of a debtor’s avoiding powers under the Code, see 
supra Part I.B.2. 
 309. See Andrew, supra note 118, at 22.  Rejection is the “estate’s way of saying no thank 
you.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 310. See id. at 16; see also Westbrook, Commission’s Recommendations, supra  note 196, 
at 471 (noting that the Code provides that rejection is the equivalent of breach of contract, 
providing the nondebtor with a pre-petition claim for damages).  For a discussion of the 
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an effect on the contract’s continuing existence, and it does not cancel, 
rescind, or terminate the contract in any fashion.311 
3.  Trademarks Are Intellectual Property:  Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. 
Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC 
In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC,312 
the Seventh Circuit rejected Lubrizol, expressing an alternative view on the 
rights of an intellectual property licensee following a licensor’s rejection of 
the license in bankruptcy.  In Sunbeam, Lakewood Engineering & 
Manufacturing Co. (Lakewood) contracted for the manufacture of its 
consumer products, including box fans, with Chicago American 
Manufacturing (CAM).313  The contract permitted CAM to place 
Lakewood’s trademarks on the completed fans and use Lakewood’s 
patents.314 
Three months into the contract, Lakewood fell into financial distress and 
several of its creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the 
company.315  The Lakewood assets, including the patents and trademarks, 
were then sold to Sunbeam Products (Sunbeam).316  Sunbeam did not want 
the Lakewood-branded fans manufactured by CAM to enter the market, and 
Lakewood’s trustee then rejected the executory part of the CAM contract 
under § 365(a).317  Because CAM continued to manufacture and sell the 
Lakewood-branded fans, Sunbeam filed an action against the company.318 
The Sunbeam court held that a trademark licensee is permitted to 
continue utilizing a licensed trademark even after the licensor’s rejection of 
the license in bankruptcy.319  Judge Easterbrook noted that several 
bankruptcy judges have inferred that Congress codified Lubrizol in 
§ 101(35A) with respect to trademarks, because the provision fails to 
 
remedy provided to nonbreaching parties following rejection, see supra notes 128–31 and 
accompanying text. 
 311. See Andrew, supra note 118, at 16; see also 9 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 18, 
§ 46:24 (“The Bankruptcy Code instructs us that rejection is a breach of the executory 
contract.  It is not avoidance, rescission, or termination.” (footnotes omitted)); Westbrook, 
Commission’s Recommendations, supra note 196, at 471 (noting that the breaching party 
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that rejection of an executory contract is not the equivalent of rescission. See, e.g., In re 
Metro Transp. Co., 87 B.R. 338, 344 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that rejection of an 
executory contract does not rescind the contract); In re Exec. Tech. Data Sys., 79 B.R. 276, 
282 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (stating that rejection is not the equivalent of rescission); In re 
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 312. 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 313. Id. at 374. 
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mention trademarks.320  However, Judge Easterbrook stated that Congress 
had a contrary intent in excluding trademarks from its definition of 
intellectual property and that “an omission is just an omission.”321  Rather 
than intending to exclude trademarks, Congress’s limited definition of 
intellectual property in § 101(35A) signified that § 365(n) has no effect on 
trademarks.322 
The Sunbeam court refused to rely on equitable grounds in holding that a 
licensee retains its rights to utilize the license following rejection.323  Judge 
Easterbrook declared that a judge may not override the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code by stating that enforcement would lead to inequitable 
results.324  Instead, the court stated that rights should depend on the Code’s 
provisions rather than on equitable principles, concluding that Lubrizol did 
not correctly interpret § 365(g).325 
The Sunbeam court began its analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
provisions by noting that outside of bankruptcy, a licensee’s right to use the 
intellectual property does not terminate upon a licensor’s breach.326  The 
court asserted that by classifying rejection as breach, § 365(g) “establish[es] 
that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in 
place.”327  While the debtor is not required to perform an order of specific 
performance following the rejection, the debtor is obligated to pay 
damages.328  Importantly, though, the court stressed that there is no reason 
to conclude that rejection eliminates any of the rights possessed by the 
licensee prior to rejection.329  The court further stated that rejection is not 
 
 320. Id. at 375. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3200 (remarking that the omission of trademarks was designed to permit more time for study 
regarding whether or not to include trademarks under the Act’s protections). 
 323. See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375–76. 
 324. Id. at 375.  Judge Easterbrook observed that notions of equity may be unreliable 
because the meaning of equity may vary depending on the bankruptcy judge, with some 
judges determining that equity favors the licensee’s reliance interests and others believing 
that equity should favor the interests of creditors. Id. at 375–76. 
 325. Id. at 376.  Judge Easterbrook was not alone in determining that Lubrizol incorrectly 
understood the application of § 365(g) in relation to rejection under § 365(a). See id.  No 
other circuit court had agreed or disagreed with Lubrizol’s holding regarding the 
consequences of rejection on the rights of an intellectual property license holder. See id.  
However, Judge Ambro, in a concurring opinion in Exide, also advocated the view that when 
a contract is rejected under § 365(a), the licensee may still retain the right to utilize the 
trademark. See id.  For a discussion of Judge Ambro’s concurrence in Exide, see supra notes 
264–83 and accompanying text. 
 326. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376. 
 327. Id. at 377. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id.  In support of this assertion, the court drew an analogy between the rejection of 
an intellectual property license and the rejection of leases.  A bankrupt lessee may reject the 
lease and pay damages as a result for abandoning the premises.  However, rejection does not 
terminate the lease and does not give the lessor the right to end the tenant’s right to 
possession of the premises. See id. 
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the equivalent of rescission, which returns the parties to the position they 
were in prior to entering into the contract.330 
The Sunbeam court concluded by noting that scholars widely criticize the 
Lubrizol decision.331  For instance, one scholar noted that Lubrizol might be 
the best example of the problems that are associated with rejection under 
the avoiding power doctrine.332  Moreover, another scholar stated that the 
most serious consequence of executory contract doctrine has been the use of 
rejection as an avoiding power, noting that the Fourth Circuit’s Lubrizol 
decision is the classic example of such consequences.333 
III.  ROOM FOR ONE MORE?  INTERPRETING THE IPLBA AS 
INCLUSIVE OF TRADEMARK LICENSES 
Part III evaluates the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Lubrizol and 
concludes that this analysis is unpersuasive in light of existing executory 
contract doctrine.  Part III.A contends that an interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code that excludes trademarks from the protections afforded to 
intellectual property licensees under § 365(n) does not comport with the 
legislative history or purposes behind the IPLBA’s enactment.  Part III.B 
advocates the Sunbeam view that rejection should not be equated with the 
use of an avoiding power.  Rather, a trademark licensee should receive the 
benefits of its bargain following a debtor’s rejection of the license under 
§ 365. 
A.  Protection of Trademark Licensees Comports with a  
Reading of the IPLBA’s Plain Language 
The Fourth Circuit analyzed § 365 incorrectly in concluding that 
rejection of an intellectual property license extinguishes the licensee’s right 
to continued use of the license.  Congress therefore acted quickly in 
codifying § 365(n) to combat the negative impact that Lubrizol had begun 
to create on the intellectual property licensing community.334  Despite 
Congress’s notable omission with respect to trademarks in its listed 
definition of intellectual property,335 there is no evidence in strong support 
of the contention that Congress intended to exclude trademarks from the 
protections afforded to intellectual property licensees under the Act. 
In analyzing the bankruptcy court cases that postdate Lubrizol and the 
IPLBA, it is clear that several courts have been persuaded by the “reasoning 
by negative implication” justification in excluding trademarks from 
 
 330. Id. (quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 
2007)). 
 331. Id.  The Sunbeam Court also stated that Lubrizol paid little attention to whether 
rejection cancels a contract, and spent far too much time addressing the correct way to 
identify executory contracts to which the rejection power may be applied. See id. 
 332. See Andrew, supra note 307, at 916. 
 333. See Westbrook, Commission’s Recommendations, supra note 196, at 470. 
 334. See supra notes 196, 201–04, 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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protection under the IPLBA.336  Thus, these courts have taken the position 
that by excluding trademarks from the listed definition of intellectual 
property, Congress intended to extend protection under the Act to only 
those forms of intellectual property explicitly recognized under 
§ 101(35A).337  Under this view, licensees of forms of intellectual property 
that are not explicitly listed under the definition of intellectual property are 
not subject to the IPLBA’s protections and, under Lubrizol, are stripped of 
their rights to continue utilizing the licenses following rejection.338 
This analysis misses the mark for several reasons.  First, the legislative 
history accompanying § 365(n) flatly contradicts this line of argument.  The 
legislative history directly addresses Congress’s omission of trademarks 
from the Act’s protections,339 explaining that additional study was 
necessary before Congress could decide whether or not to include 
trademarks within the definition of “intellectual property” under the 
Code.340  The legislative history suggests that Congress decided to postpone 
taking action on the issue, concluding that it should be permitted to develop 
based on the equitable treatment of the bankruptcy courts.341  At a 
minimum, the legislative history supports the conclusion that a decision 
regarding the protection offered to trademark licensees under the Act was 
deferred; the legislative history certainly does not support the contention 
that protection for trademark licensees was denied. 
Second, the legislative history in fact provides better support for the 
contrary view:  trademarks should be included under the IPLBA’s 
protections.  Because the legislative history states that whether or not 
protection under the IPLBA should be extended to trademarks is a question 
best left to the equitable treatment of bankruptcy courts, it appears that 
Congress intended for equity to play an important role in resolving this 
issue. 
Bankruptcy courts have a long and well-developed history as courts of 
equity.342  From a fairness perspective, it would make little sense to 
conclude that a court of equity would prefer to extinguish the rights of a 
trademark licensee to continue utilizing a license upon rejection rather than 
providing the licensee with the option to continue using the license.  
Trademark licenses are often quite valuable to the business of a licensee,343 
and a rule of law that would deny protection to trademark licensees, thus 
potentially destroying or severely damaging their businesses,344 seems far 
from equitable.  In fact, Lubrizol itself noted that the consequences of its 
decision were “harsh,” which clearly does not support the view that 
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extinguishing a licensee’s right to continue using a license following 
rejection is equitable.345  Moreover, several bankruptcy courts have relied 
upon equitable considerations in holding that a debtor may not reject a 
licensing agreement, especially when the rejection will severely damage the 
licensee’s business.346 
Third, the factors prompting Congress’s enactment of § 365(n) strongly 
support a reading of the statute that grants trademark licensees the same 
protections afforded to licensees of patents and copyrights.  Congress 
enacted the IPLBA in response to the detrimental effects of Lubrizol on 
licensing arrangements, as well as the negative impact of Lubrizol on the 
willingness of companies to enter into agreements with companies in 
financial distress.347  These concerns apply with just as much force in the 
trademark licensing context as they do in copyright and patent licensing.348  
Moreover, trademark licensing is an enormous business and licensing 
agreements are critical to the financial stability of businesses owned by both 
licensors and licensees.349  Given the size of the trademark licensing 
business, if courts were to interpret § 365(n) as depriving trademark 
licensees of their bargained-for rights following rejection, detrimental 
consequences may result for technological development and licensing 
relations. 
B.  Courts Should Not Equate Rejection with the  
Use of an Avoiding Power 
The following section reevaluates the Fourth Circuit’s contention in 
Lubrizol that the rejection of an executory contract results in termination of 
the contract.  Part III.B.1 contends that courts such as Lubrizol have 
misinterpreted executory contract doctrine in concluding that rejection is 
the equivalent of an avoiding power.  Part III.B.2 suggests an amendment to 
the Bankruptcy Code in order to clearly establish that trademark licensees 
retain their rights to use licensed trademarks following a debtor’s rejection. 
1.  Rejection Does Not Terminate Preexisting Rights 
Under an Executory Contract 
In holding that a trademark licensee retains the right to utilize the 
trademark following rejection,350 the Sunbeam Court noted the widespread 
criticism associated with the Lubrizol opinion.351  In particular, Sunbeam 
stated that scholars have “uniformly criticized” Lubrizol for equating 
rejection with the use of an avoiding power.352 
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When a debtor rejects an intellectual property licensing agreement in 
bankruptcy, the rights of the licensee do not evaporate.353  This principle is 
the crucial idea underpinning the Sunbeam analysis and provides a strong 
justification for the contention that a trademark licensee should retain its 
right to use a trademark following rejection.354  Rejection simply frees the 
estate from the duty to continue performing burdensome obligations under 
the contract.355  In addition, a careful look at the legislative record reveals 
that Congress either has not considered the avoiding-power-rejection 
doctrine or has disapproved of it by enacting specific provisions.356  Thus, 
there is ample support for the assertion that a trademark licensee should 
retain its rights to utilize a licensed trademark following a debtor’s 
rejection. 
2.  A Proposed Amendment to the Bankruptcy Code 
To avoid the negative effects stemming from Lubrizol in the trademark 
context, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code in one of two ways.  
First, and most intuitively, Congress can amend § 101(35A) to explicitly 
include trademarks under the IPLBA’s protections.  A second option that 
Congress might consider is amending the Act to state that rejection is not an 
avoiding power.  Both solutions would put to rest any doubts regarding the 
treatment that should be given to trademark licenses under § 365(n) 
following rejection. 
CONCLUSION 
Trademark licensing is critical to technological development in the 
United States.357  Shortly after Lubrizol, Congress passed the IPLBA to 
remedy the negative effects that the Fourth Circuit decision had on 
technological and economic growth.358  Congress exempted patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets from rejection under § 365(a), but failed to 
explicitly include trademarks.359  Instead, Congress postponed 
consideration of trademarks, leaving the treatment of this form of 
intellectual property to the equitable discretion of bankruptcy courts.360 
While many courts have excluded trademarks from coverage under the 
IPLBA due to reasoning by negative implication,361 the Act’s legislative 
history and the balance of equities both tip in favor of permitting trademark 
licensees to retain their rights to use the trademarks following rejection.362  
In addition, executory contract doctrine does not equate rejection of an 
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executory contract with the use of an avoiding power.363  Given the 
importance of trademarks in the U.S. intellectual property licensing 
scheme,364 the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to either include 
trademarks under the definition of intellectual property or explicitly provide 
that rejection does not give rise to an avoiding power. 
 
 
 363. See supra notes 116–20, 307–11, 353–56 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra Part I.A.3. 
